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Recent empirical evidence has highlighted how the export patterns of multi-product firms 
dominate world trade flows, and how these multi-product firms respond to different economic 
conditions across export markets by varying the number of products they export. In this paper, 
we further analyze the effects of those export market conditions on the relative export sales of 
those goods: we refer to this as the firm's product mix choice. We build a theoretical model of 
multi-product firms that highlights how market size and geography (the market sizes of and 
bilateral economic distances to trading partners) affects both a firm's exported product range and 
its exported product mix across market destinations. We show how tougher competition in an 
export market - associated with a downward shift in the distribution of markups across all 
products sold in the market - induces a firm to skew its export sales towards its best performing 
products. We find very strong confirmation of this competitive effect for French exporters across 
export market destinations. Our theoretical model shows how this effect of export market 
c o m p e t i t i o n  o n  a  f i r m ' s  p r o d u c t  m i x  t h e n  t r a n s l a t e s  i n t o  d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  m e a s u r e d  f i r m 
productivity. Thus, a firm operating a given technology will produce relatively more output per 
worker when it exports to markets with tougher competition. This productivity gain is further 
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Recent empirical evidence has highlighted how the export patterns of multi-product ￿rms dominate
world trade ￿ ows, and how these multi-product ￿rms respond to di⁄erent economic conditions across
export markets by varying the number of products they export.1 In this paper, we further analyze
the e⁄ects of those export market conditions on the relative export sales of those goods: we refer
to this as the ￿rm￿ s product mix choice. We build a theoretical model of multi-product ￿rms that
highlights how market size and geography (the market sizes of and bilateral economic distances
to trading partners) a⁄ects both a ￿rm￿ s exported product range and its exported product mix
across market destinations. We show how tougher competition in an export market ￿associated
with a downward shift in the distribution of markups across all products sold in the market ￿
induces a ￿rm to skew its export sales towards its best performing products. We ￿nd very strong
con￿rmation of this competitive e⁄ect for French exporters across export market destinations. We
also highlight how bilateral trade barriers/enhancers additionally skew a ￿rm￿ s export product mix,
after controlling for export market conditions. Our theoretical model shows how this e⁄ect of trade
barriers and export market competition on a ￿rm￿ s product mix then translates into di⁄erences in
measured ￿rm productivity. Thus, a ￿rm operating a given technology will produce relatively more
output per worker when it exports to markets with tougher competition, or when trade barriers fall.
This productivity gain is also compounded by concurrent changes in the mix of exported products
in response to those changes in its trading environment.2
Feenstra and Ma (2008) and Eckel and Neary (2009) also build theoretical models of multi-
product ￿rms that highlight the e⁄ect of competition on the distribution of ￿rm product sales.
Eckel and Neary (2009) also emphasize the ensuing link between competition and ￿rm produc-
tivity. Both models incorporate the cannibalization e⁄ect that occurs as large ￿rms expand their
product range. In our model, we rely on the competition e⁄ects from the demand side, which
are driven by variations in the number of sellers and their average prices across export markets.
The cannibalization e⁄ect does not occur as ￿rms produce a discrete number of products and
thus never attain ￿nite mass. The bene￿ts of this simpli￿cation is that we can consider an open
economy equilibrium with multiple asymmetric countries and asymmetric trade barriers whereas
Feenstra and Ma (2008) and Eckel and Neary (2009) restrict their analysis to a single globalized
1See Mayer and Ottaviano (2007) for Europe, Bernard et al (2007) for the U.S., and Arkolakis and Muendler
(2008) for Latin America.
2Bernard et al (2006) and Eckel and Neary (2008) also emphasize this channel between globalization and within-
￿rm productivity changes in a world with symmetric countries. We discuss those papers in further detail below.
1world with no trade barriers. Thus, our model is able to capture the key role of geography in
shaping di⁄erences in competition across export market destinations.3
Another approach to the modeling of multi-product ￿rms relies on a nested C.E.S. structure
for preferences, where a continuum of ￿rms produce a continuum of products. The cannibalization
e⁄ect is ruled out by restricting the nests in which ￿rms can introduce new products. Allanson
and Montagna (2005) consider such a model in a closed economy, while Arkolakis and Muendler
(2008) and Bernard et al (2006) develop extensions to open economies. Given the C.E.S. structure of
preferences and the continuum assumptions, markups across all ￿rms and products are exogenously
￿xed. Thus, di⁄erences in market conditions or proportional reductions in trade costs have no
e⁄ect on a ￿rm￿ s product mix choice (the relative distribution of export sales across products).
The latter can only be a⁄ected by variations in the delivered costs of the goods (di⁄erences in
production costs and non-proportional delivery costs). Arkolakis and Muendler (2008) and Bernard
et al (2006) document that those cost di⁄erences are substantial and that a large proportion of
those di⁄erences can be attributed to production costs that do not vary across destinations: the
distribution of within-￿rm product export sales is highly skewed, and the ranking of those export
sales is highly correlated across export market destinations.4 We ￿nd that the same patterns hold
for French exporters. This motivates the concept of a ￿rm￿ s product ladder, starting with its core
competency (its best selling product) followed by decreasing productivity/quality ladder for the
ensuing products.5 We also adopt this concept of a core competency and productivity/quality
ladder; in our model with endogenous markups, the distribution of exported product sales will vary
with market conditions ￿even after controlling for those cost di⁄erences.
Bernard et al (2006) and Baldwin and Gu (2009) also theoretically analyze the e⁄ects of a
symmetric trade liberalization between symmetric countries. They ￿nd that such a liberalization
will induce ￿rms to reduce the number/mass of products they produce. Given the productivity
di⁄erences along the product ladder, Bernard et al (2006) show that this reduction in product scope
towards a ￿rm￿ s core competency also leads to within-￿rm productivity gains for non-exporters
(including those ￿rms that are induced to export for the ￿rst time).6 When we restrict our model
3Nocke and Yeaple (2008) and Baldwin and Gu (2009) also develop models with multi-product ￿rms and a pro-
competitive e⁄ect coming from the demand side. These models investigate the e⁄ects of globalization on a ￿rm￿ s
product scope and average production levels per product. However, those models consider the case of ￿rms producing
symmetric products whereas we focus on the e⁄ects of competition on the within-￿rm distribution of product sales.
4Arkolakis and Muendler (2008) examine the distribution of product export sales for Brazilian and Chilean ￿rms,
while Bernard et al (2006) report those patterns for U.S. ￿rms.
5Eckel and Neary (2009) also adopt this modeling concept. Arkolakis and Muendler (2008) and Bernard et al
(2006) additionally introduce a stochastic element of the productivity/quality ladder that is market speci￿c.
6Eckel and Neary (2009) also ￿nd similar e⁄ects for an increase in the world market size, absent any trade costs.
2to symmetric countries, we also obtain a similar prediction for the e⁄ects of trade liberalization.
However, our model predicts that trade liberalization will additionally lead ￿rms to skew both
domestic and export sales towards their core products (for a given range of products in either
market). This opens another channel for within-￿rm productivity gains from trade liberalization.
Empirically, both the e⁄ects on product scope and the skewness of the product mix have been
documented for the case of trade liberalization in North America. Baldwin and Gu (2009), Bernard
et al (2006), and Iacovone and Javorcik (2008) all show how this trade liberalization has induced
(respectively) Canadian, U.S., and Mexican ￿rms to reduce the number of products they produce.
Baldwin and Gu (2009) and Bernard et al (2006) further report that CUSFTA has induced a
signi￿cant increase in the skewness of production across products (an increase in entropy). This
could be due to an increase in export sales for the ￿ better￿ products relative to the marginal
products only sold in the domestic economy ￿absent any changes in the competitive environment;
but it could also be due to an increase in the skewness of both export and domestic sales towards
the best performing products ￿which would be explained by an increase in competition due to
trade liberalization. Iacovone and Javorcik (2008) show that this is indeed the case for Mexican
￿rms: they report that the exports of a ￿rm￿ s ￿ better￿products (higher export sales) expanded
signi￿cantly more than those for worse performing products during the period of trade expansion
from 1994-2003. Iacovone and Javorcik (2008) also compare the relative contributions of exported
product scope and the export product mix (changes in exports of previously exported products)
for Mexican exports to the U.S. following NAFTA. They ￿nd that changes in the product mix
explain the preponderance of the changes in export patterns of Mexican ￿rms. Importantly for
the predictions of our model, they ￿nd that both expansions as well as contractions in exported
product sales (for some ￿rms/products) played an important role. Our theoretical model explains
how a symmetric reduction in proportional trade costs induces ￿rms to increase export sales for
their best products while simultaneously reducing export sales of other products further down the
ladder. The increase in the skewness of both export and domestic sales is driven by the e⁄ects of
trade liberalization on the toughness of competition across markets.
Our paper proceeds as follows. We ￿rst develop a closed economy version of our model in order to
focus on the endogenous responses of a ￿rm￿ s product scope and product mix to market conditions.
We also show how those choices translate into di⁄erences in observable ￿rm performance measures.
Even in a closed economy, increases in market size lead to increases in within-￿rm productivity as
well as aggregate productivity gains via reallocations across ￿rms. We then extend our model to an
3open economy. To ￿x intuition, we initially abstract from third country e⁄ects via geography and
develop a 2-country model. We introduce both proportional and non-proportional trade costs across
the product ladder ￿but then show how the consequences of both types of costs can be subsumed
within a single trade cost index.7 We then analyze the e⁄ects of multilateral trade liberalization
when the trade costs are assumed to be symmetric. We then turn to the multi-country case with
an arbitrary matrix of bilateral trade costs. The equilibrium connects di⁄erences in market size and
geography to the toughness of competition in every market, and how the latter shapes the within-
￿rm distribution of product export sales. Lastly, we empirically test those predictions, examining
how market size, geography and trade barriers/enhancers a⁄ect that within-￿rm distribution of
product export sales.
2 Closed Economy
We introduce multi-product ￿rms in the model of Melitz and Ottaviano (2008). We start with a
closed economy where L consumers each supply one unit of labor.
2.1 Preferences and Demand
Preferences are de￿ned over a continuum of di⁄erentiated varieties indexed by i 2 ￿, and a ho-


























i represent the individual consumption levels of the numeraire good and each variety
i. The demand parameters ￿; ￿; and ￿ are all positive. The parameters ￿ and ￿ index the
substitution pattern between the di⁄erentiated varieties and the numeraire: increases in ￿ and
decreases in ￿ both shift out the demand for the di⁄erentiated varieties relative to the numeraire.
The parameter ￿ indexes the degree of product di⁄erentiation between the varieties. In the limit




The varieties are then perfect substitutes. The degree of product di⁄erentiation increases with ￿
as consumers give increasing weight to the distribution of consumption levels across varieties.
The marginal utilities for all goods are bounded, and a consumer may thus not have positive de-
mand for any particular good. We assume that consumers have positive demands for the numeraire
7Our empirical results strongly con￿rm the presence of non-proportional trade costs across the product ladder.
4good (qc
0 > 0). The inverse demand for each variety i is then given by
pi = ￿ ￿ ￿qc
i ￿ ￿Qc; (2)
whenever qc
i > 0. Let ￿￿ ￿ ￿ be the subset of varieties that are consumed (qc
i > 0). (2) can then













￿ p; 8i 2 ￿￿; (3)
where M is the measure of consumed varieties in ￿￿ and ￿ p = (1=M)
R
i2￿￿ pidi is their average price.




(￿￿ + ￿M￿ p) ￿ pmax; (4)
where the right hand side price bound pmax represents the price at which demand for a variety is
driven to zero. Note that (2) implies pmax ￿ ￿. In contrast to the case of C.E.S. demand, the
price elasticity of demand, "i ￿ j(@qi=@pi)(pi=qi)j = [(pmax=pi) ￿ 1]
￿1 ; is not uniquely determined
by the level of product di⁄erentiation ￿. Given the latter, lower average prices ￿ p or a larger
number of competing varieties M induce a decrease in the price bound pmax and an increase in
the price elasticity of demand "i at any given pi. We characterize this as a ￿ tougher￿competitive
environment.8
Welfare can be evaluated using the indirect utility function associated with (1):
















where Ic is the consumer￿ s income and ￿2
p = (1=M)
R
i2￿￿ (pi ￿ ￿ p)
2 di represents the variance of





p=￿. Welfare naturally rises with decreases in average prices ￿ p. It also rises with increases
in the variance of prices ￿2
p (holding the mean price ￿ p constant), as consumers then re-optimize their
purchases by shifting expenditures towards lower priced varieties as well as the numeraire good.
Finally, the demand system exhibits ￿ love of variety￿ : holding the distribution of prices constant
(namely holding the mean ￿ p and variance ￿2
p of prices constant), welfare rises with increases in
8We also note that, given this competitive environment (given N and ￿ p), the price elasticity "i monotonically
increases with the price pi along the demand curve.
5product variety M.
2.2 Production and Firm Behavior
Labor is the only factor of production and is inelastically supplied in a competitive market. The
numeraire good is produced under constant returns to scale at unit cost; its market is also compet-
itive. These assumptions imply a unit wage. Entry in the di⁄erentiated product sector is costly as
each ￿rm incurs product development and production startup costs. Subsequent production of each
variety exhibits constant returns to scale. While it may decide to produce more than one variety,
each ￿rm has one key variety corresponding to its ￿ core competency￿ . This is associated with a
core marginal cost c (equal to unit labor requirement).9 Research and development yield uncertain
outcomes for c, and ￿rms learn about this cost level only after making the irreversible investment
fE required for entry. We model this as a draw from a common (and known) distribution G(c)
with support on [0;cM].
The introduction of an additional variety pulls a ￿rm away from its core competency, which we
model as higher marginal costs of production for those varieties. We think of these costs increases as
also re￿ ecting decreases in product quality/appeal as ￿rms move away from their core competency.
For simplicity, we maintain product symmetry on the demand side and capture any decrease in
product appeal as an increased production cost. We label the additional production cost for a
new variety a customization cost. A ￿rm can introduce any number of new varieties, but each
additional variety entails an additional customization cost (as ￿rms move further away from their
core competency). We index by m the varieties produced by the same ￿rm in increasing order
of distance from their core competency with m = 0 referring to the core variety. We then call
v(m;c) the marginal cost for variety m produced by a ￿rm with core marginal cost c and assume
v(m;c) = !￿mc with ! 2 (0;1). This de￿nes a ￿rm-level ￿ competence ladder￿ . In the limit, as !
goes to zero, any ￿rm will only produce at most its core variety and we are back to single product
￿rms as in Melitz and Ottaviano (2008).
Since the entry cost is sunk, ￿rms that can cover at least the marginal cost of their core variety
survive and produce. All other ￿rms exit the industry. Surviving ￿rms maximize their pro￿ts
using the residual demand function (3). In so doing, those ￿rms take the average price level ￿ p and
total number of varieties M as given. This monopolistic competition outcome is maintained with
9For simplicity, we do not model any overhead production costs. This would signi￿cantly increase the complexity
of our model without yielding much new insight.
6multi-product ￿rms as any ￿rm can only produce a countable number of products, which is a subset
of measure zero of the total mass of varieties M.




[p(v) ￿ v]: (6)
The pro￿t maximizing price p(v) may be above the price bound pmax from (4), in which case the
variety is not supplied. Let vD reference the cuto⁄cost for a variety to be pro￿tably produced. This
variety earns zero pro￿t as its price is driven down to its marginal cost, p(vD) = vD = pmax, and
its demand level q(vD) is driven to zero. Hence, the threshold cost vD summarizes the competitive
environment across all varieties produced. Let r(v) = p(v)q(v), ￿(v) = r(v)￿q(v)v, ￿(v) = p(v)￿v
denote the revenue, pro￿t, and (absolute) markup of a variety with cost v. All these performance


























As expected, lower cost varieties have lower prices and earn higher revenues and pro￿ts than
varieties with higher costs. However, lower cost varieties do not pass on all of the cost di⁄erential
to consumers in the form of lower prices: they also have higher markups (in both absolute and
relative terms) than varieties with higher costs.
Firms with core competency v > vD cannot pro￿tably produce their core variety and exit.
Thus cD = vD is also the cuto⁄ for ￿rm survival and an equivalent measure of the ￿ toughness￿of
competition. We assume that cM is high enough that it is always above cD, so exit rates are always
positive. All ￿rms with core cost c < cD earn positive pro￿ts (gross of the entry cost) on their core
varieties and remain in the industry. Some ￿rms will also earn positive pro￿ts from the introduction
of additional varieties. In particular, ￿rms with cost c such that v(m;c) ￿ vD () c ￿ !mcD earn
positive pro￿ts on their m-th additional variety and thus produce at least m + 1 varieties. The





0 if c > cD,
maxfm j c ￿ !mcDg + 1 if c ￿ cD.
(8)
which is (weakly) decreasing for all c 2 [0;cM]. Accordingly, the number of varieties produced by a
￿rm with cost c is indeed an integer number (and not a mass with positive measure). This number
is an increasing step function of the ￿rm￿ s productivity 1=c, as depicted in ￿gure 1 below so that
















Figure 1: Number of Varieties Produced as a Function of Firm Productivity
Given a mass of entrants NE, the distribution of costs across all varieties is determined by the
optimal ￿rm product range choice M(c) as well as the distribution of core competencies G(c). Let
Mv(v) denote the measure function for varieties (the measure of varieties produced at cost v or
lower, given NE entrants). Further de￿ne H(v) ￿ Mv(v)=NE as the normalized measure of varieties
per unit mass of entrants. Then H(v) =
P1
m=0 G(!mv) and is exogenously determined from G(:)
and !. Given a unit mass of entrants, there will be a mass G(v) of varieties with cost v or less; a
mass G(!v) of ￿rst additional varieties (with cost v or less); a mass G(!2v) of second additional
varieties; and so and so forth. The measure H(v) sums over all these varieties.
82.3 Free Entry and Flexible Product Mix
Prior to entry, the expected ￿rm pro￿t is
R cD




￿ (v (m;c)) (9)
denotes the pro￿t of a ￿rm with cost c. If this pro￿t were negative for all c￿ s, no ￿rms would
enter the industry. As long as some ￿rms produce, the expected pro￿t is driven to zero by the




























where the second equality states that the expected ￿rm pro￿t equals expected variety pro￿t ac-
counting for core and non-core varieties.
The free entry condition (10) determines the cost cuto⁄ cD = vD. This cuto⁄, in turn, deter-
mines the aggregate mass of varieties, since vD = p(vD) must also be equal to the zero demand




(￿￿ + ￿M￿ p):
























depends only on vD.10 Finally, the mass of entrants is given by NE = M=H(vD), which can in turn
be used to obtain the mass of producing ￿rms N = NEG(cD).
10We also use the relationship between average cost and price ￿ v = 2￿ p ￿ vD; which is obtained from (7).
92.4 Parametrization of Technology
All the results derived so far hold for any distribution of core cost draws G(c). However, in order
to simplify some of the ensuing analysis, we use a speci￿c parametrization for this distribution.
In particular, we assume that core productivity draws 1=c follow a Pareto distribution with lower







; c 2 [0;cM]: (12)
The shape parameter k indexes the dispersion of cost draws. When k = 1, the cost distribution is
uniform on [0;cM]. As k increases, the relative number of high cost ￿rms increases, and the cost
distribution is more concentrated at these higher cost levels. As k goes to in￿nity, the distribution
becomes degenerate at cM. Any truncation of the cost distribution from above will retain the same
distribution function and shape parameter k. The productivity distribution of surviving ￿rms
will therefore also be Pareto with shape k, and the truncated cost distribution will be given by
GD(c) = (c=cD)
k ; c 2 [0;cD].





G(!mc) = ￿G(c); (13)
where ￿ =
￿
1 ￿ !k￿￿1 > 1 is an index of multi-product ￿ exibility (which varies monotonically with

















where ￿ ￿ 2(k + 1)(k + 2)(cM)
k fE is a technology index that combines the e⁄ects of bet-
ter distribution of cost draws (lower cM) and lower entry costs fE. We assume that cM >
p
[2(k + 1)(k + 2)￿fE]=(L￿) in order to ensure that cD < cM as was previously anticipated. Note
that, in the limit, when the marginal costs of non-core varieties becomes in￿nitely large (! ! 0),
multi-product ￿ exibility ￿ goes to one (no multi product ￿rms) and (14) boils down to the single-













Since the cuto⁄ level completely summarizes the distribution of prices as well as all the other
performance measures, it also uniquely determines welfare from (5):











Welfare increases with decreases in the cuto⁄ cD, as the latter induces increases in product variety
M as well as decreases in the average price ￿ p (these e⁄ects dominate the negative impact of the
lower price variance).11
2.5 Competition, Productivity and Welfare
The variety measures (7) can be aggregated to the ￿rm and industry levels to see how the toughness




v (m;c)q (v (m;c)); Q(c) ￿
M(c)￿1 X
m=0








denote total ￿rm cost (employment), output, revenue, and pro￿t respectively, we can then compute




























11This welfare measure re￿ ects the reduced consumption of the numeraire to account for the labor resources used
to cover the entry costs.
11where we have used the fact that all produced varieties share the same Pareto distribution (13).
Expressions (18) show that a tougher competitive environment raises average output per worker
while reducing average price and average markup. Empirically, physical units of output are often
not accurately recorded (especially for multi-product ￿rms) and productivity is then measured as
















Hence, as competition gets tougher not only physical productivity but also measured productivity
increase.
These industry behavior is due to: the exit of less productive ￿rms (given (15) and N =
MG(cD)=H(vD)); the (weak) drop of varieties away from the core by surviving ￿rms (given (8));
and the reallocation of ￿rms￿productive resources to the surving products closer to the core. To see
this last channel at work, consider two varieties produced by a ￿rm with cost c, index them m and
m0, and assume m < m0 so that m is closer than m0 to the core. By (7) the ratio of employment







As this expression is a decreasing function of cD for m < m0, tougher competition leads to the
reallocation of employment from variety m0 to variety m closer to the core. The output, revenue,
and pro￿t ratios of m to m0 also rise accordingly whereas the price ratio falls. In other words,
within the ￿rm the distributions of employment, output, revenue, and pro￿t become more skewed
towards the core whereas the distribution of prices ￿ attens.
These within-￿rm reallocations improve ￿rm productivity even for a given number of varieties
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As shown in Appendix A, this measure is a decreasing functions of cD, thus showing that the ￿rm
becomes more productive when competition gets tougher.
To sum up, recalling (14), we can conclude that increases in market size, technology improve-
12ments (a fall in cM or fE), or increases in product substitutability (a rise in ￿) lead to decreases in
the cuto⁄ cD and increases in both the mass of varieties produced (a rise in M), and the mass of
surviving ￿rms (a rise in N). Although the average number of varieties produced per ￿rm remains
constant at M=N = ￿, each ￿rm responds to tougher competition by decreasing the number of va-
rieties produced M(c) irrespective of its core cost c. The average number of varieties M=N remains
constant due to the e⁄ects of selection as higher cost ￿rms producing the fewest number of varieties
exit. All surviving ￿rms (weakly) drop varieties far from the core and reallocate labor resources
among the remaining varieties close to the core. As a result, within-￿rm productivity increases due
to the compounding e⁄ects of this reallocation of the product mix and the variety selection e⁄ect
in terms of product scope. Also aggregate productivity increases due to both a within-￿rm and
across-￿rm selection e⁄ect. Output and sales per variety increase for all surviving varieties, and the
distribution of markups across these products shifts down. Finally, welfare increases due to higher
productivity and product variety, and lower markups.
3 Open Economy
We now turn to the open economy in order to examine how market size and geography determine
di⁄erences in the toughness of competition across markets ￿and how the latter translates into
di⁄erences in the exporters￿product mix. We allow for an arbitrary number of countries and
asymmetric trade costs. Let J denote the number of countries, indexed by l = 1;:::;J. The
markets are segmented, although any produced variety can be exported. This entails an additional
customization cost (over and above the customization for the domestic market). We assume that
￿rms everywhere face the same step cost !￿1 for varieties produced for their domestic market, but
allow the additional customization cost for exports from country l to country h,
￿
￿lh￿￿1 ￿ 1, to





￿￿1 ￿ 1 across country-pairs.
There is also an iceberg trade cost ￿lh > 1 that varies across country-pairs and is incurred
once for each variety that is exported from h to l. For notational convenience, we subsume the
￿rst customization cost 1=￿lh into this iceberg trade cost so that we can write the marginal cost




￿￿m c, with delivered
cost ￿lhvlh
X(m;c).12 The step cost for varieties produced on each domestic market remains !￿1,
12While the iceberg cost is incurred in units of the transported variety, the customization cost is paid in units of
labor. Moreover, while the former is arguably positively correlated with distance, the correlation between the latter
13leading to the same marginal cost function for variety m, vl
D(m;c) = !￿mc, as in the closed
economy. Let !lh ￿ ￿lh! ￿ ! denote the combined (inverse) step cost for exported varieties





is a natural benchmark of no step-di⁄erences between exported and domestic varieties. In that











= !m0￿m for any two exported varieties m and m0 by a given
￿rm. Variations in ￿lh allow us to consider cases where that relative delivered cost will vary across
destinations for a ￿rm. We ￿nd strong con￿rmation of this e⁄ect in our empirical results.
3.1 Product Mix and Product Scope
Let pl






￿￿ + ￿Ml￿ pl
￿
; (20)
where Ml is the total number of products selling in country l (the total number of domestic and
exported varieties) and ￿ pl is their average price. Let ￿l
D(v) and ￿lh
X(v) represent the maximized
value of pro￿ts from domestic and export sales to country h for a variety with cost v produced in























D=￿lh. As was the case in the closed economy, the cuto⁄vl
D, l = 1;:::;J, summarizes
all the e⁄ects of market conditions in country l relevant for all ￿rm performance measures. The


































D(m;c) with a strict inequality whenever ￿
lh < 1 and m > 0. In those cases, a ￿rm
that produces variety m at cost v for the domestic market cannot produce that same variety at cost v for the export




X(v) do not refer to domestic and export pro￿ts for the same variety m.
14As in the closed economy, cl
D = vl
D will be the cuto⁄ for ￿rm survival in country l. Similarly, clh
X =
vlh
X will be the ￿rm export cuto⁄(no ￿rm with c > clh
X can pro￿tably export any varieties from l to h).
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+ 1 if c ￿ clh
X.
























Entry is unrestricted in both countries. Firms choose a production location prior to entry
and paying the sunk entry cost. We assume that the entry cost fE and cost distribution G(c)
are identical in all countries (although this can be relaxed).14 We also assume the same Pareto
parametrization (12) for core competencies in all countries. A prospective entrant￿ s expected pro￿ts































































































in an analogous way to ￿ and use the relationship ch
D = ￿lhclh
X.
Setting the expected pro￿t equal to the entry cost yields the free entry conditions:
















￿lh￿￿k < 1 is a measure of ￿ freeness￿of trade to country h that incorporates
both the ￿ physical￿trade cost ￿h as well as the step di⁄erences between domestic and export market
customization. The technology index ￿ is the same as in the closed economy case. We also allow
for the possibility of internal trade cost so that ￿ll may also be above 1. If not, then ￿ll = 1, since
￿ll = ￿ by de￿nition.
The free entry conditions (23) yield a system of J equations that can be solved for the J
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and jChlj is the cofactor of its ￿hl element. Cross-country di⁄erences in cuto⁄s now arise from two
sources: own country size (Ll) and geographical remoteness, captured by
PJ
h=1 jChlj=jPj. Central
countries bene￿ting from a large local market have lower cuto⁄s, and exhibit tougher competition,
than peripheral countries with a small local market.
As in the closed economy, the threshold price condition in country l (20), along with the resulting
Pareto distribution of all prices for varieties sold in l (domestic prices and export prices have an
identical distribution in country l) yield a zero-cuto⁄ pro￿t condition linking the variety cuto⁄
vl
D = cl









Given a positive mass of entrants Nh





E varieties to country l: Summing over all these varieties (including those produced











The latter provides a system of J linear equations that can be solved for the number of entrants in


















As in the closed economy, the cuto⁄ level completely summarizes the distribution of prices as well
as all the other performance measures. Hence, it also uniquely determines welfare:














which is a decreasing function of the cl
D.
It is worthwhile pointing out that, across markets, market size has exactly the same e⁄ect on
competition, hence on within-￿rm reallocations across varieties and productivity, as in the closed
economy. Speci￿cally, since the domestic cost cuto⁄ cl
D decreases monotonically as country size
Ll increases according to (24), the toughness of competition in a market induces the same ￿rm
and product reallocations that were previously described for the closed economy: sellers drop their
marginal varieties and focus on varieties closer to their core competency; they also re-allocate
their labor resources towards the production of those ￿ core￿varieties (lower m). Firm productivity
increases due to these compounding e⁄ects. Inter-￿rm reallocations (the lowest productivity sellers
exit) generate an additional aggregate productivity increase in the sellers population.
To see this the e⁄ect of intra-￿rm reallocations, consider a ￿rm with cost c that sells M varieties
from country l to country h. In this case ￿rm output per worker (excluding output wasted in transit


























































which boils down to 1=
￿
c￿lh￿
for M = 1 whereas for M ￿ 2 is indeed a decreasing function of cD
(see Appendix A).
3.2 Bi-Lateral Trade Patterns and the Margins of Export
We now investigate the predictions of this multi-country trade model for the composition of bi-



















X(v)dG(v) represents the aggregate bi-lateral trade from l to h across
the Nl
E￿lhG(clh
X) exported varieties. This aggregate trade ￿ ow can be decomposed into the product
of the number of exporting ￿rms, Nlh
X ￿ Nl
EG(clh
X), the average number of exported varieties per








X). This last term,











Lower trade barriers from l to h will clearly increase the export ￿ ow rlh
X(v) for any exported variety.
However, the lower trade barriers will also induce new varieties to be exported to h. Since these new
exported varieties will have the lowest trade volumes, these two e⁄ects will generate opposite forces
on the average export ￿ ow ￿ rlh
X. Given our parametrization, these opposing forces exactly cancel out.
We do not emphasize this exact result, but rather the presence of opposing forces generating the
relationship between trade costs and average exports per variety. On the other hand, increases in
importer country size generate unambiguous predictions for this intensive margin of trade: increases
in country size toughen the selection e⁄ect for exported varieties (skewing the distribution towards
18varieties with higher trade volumes), and also generates increases in export ￿ ows rlh
X(v) for the
varieties with the largest trade volumes (lower v).
Trade costs ￿lh as well as di⁄erences in importer characteristics generate ambiguous e⁄ects on
the average number of exported varieties per ￿rm: higher trade costs or tougher competition in
h will both reduce the number of exported varieties by any given exporting ￿rm. However, they
will also generate a selection e⁄ect among ￿rms: lower productivity ￿rms exporting the smallest
number of varieties exit the export market. Given our parametrization, these opposing forces cancel
out, leaving the average number of exported varieties ￿lh unchanged. Again, we emphasize the
presence of competing forces for this margin of trade. However, changes in the additional step cost
associated with customization for the export market in h do generate unambiguous predictions for
the average number of exported varieties per ￿rm: decreases in this additional cost will increase
the average number of exported varieties, as all ￿rms export more varieties.
Lastly, exporter and importer country characteristics, as well as trade barriers will have a









There are no countervailing forces at this ￿nal extensive margin: anything that makes it harder
for ￿rms from country l to break into the export market in h (higher trade barriers or tougher
competition in h) will decrease the number of exporting ￿rms. Holding those forces constant, an
increase in the number of entrants (into production) in l will proportionally increase in the number
of exporting ￿rms to any given destination.
3.3 Exporters￿Product Mix Across Destinations
We now focus on the predictions of our model for the within ￿rm distribution of product sales
across export destinations. Given (28), variety m exported by a ￿rm with cost c from country l to


















Accordingly, for any two exported varieties to h, the ratio of export sales depends on the toughness
of competition in h (inversely related to ch
D) as well as on the bilateral trade and customization






















as ￿lh!lh 2 (0;1). Accordingly, in any given export market h varieties farther away from the core
sell less than varieties closer to the core, the more so the tougher competition (smaller ch
D). This is
due to the fact that dlnrlh
X(m;c)=dlnm is negative and increasing in ch
D. In other words, tougher
competition skews export sales towards varieties closer to the core (lower m). This is the key
prediction of our model that we bring to the data in the next section. Since tougher competition
entails higher demand elasticities at any given price, the ￿rm responds by lowering its markups
across all exported products, which increases the relative sales of its better performing products
selling at a lower relative price.17
Expression (29) generates also predictions for the response of export sales to di⁄erences in export
costs. Holding the toughness of competition ￿xed, an increase in either trade or customization costs
(higher ￿lh or lower ￿lh) skew export sales towards varieties closer to the core: dlnrlh
X(m;c)=dlnm
is negative, decreasing in ￿lh and increasing in ￿lh.
In the case of the proportional trade cost ￿lh, this e⁄ect is driven by increases in demand price
elasticities at higher cost levels since the ratio of delivered cost is una⁄ected by ￿lh. It is a feature
of the linear demand system that price elasticity increases as a ￿rm moves up its demand curve
(this feature is shared with most other parametrization of demand that do not feature exogenous
price elasticities). Thus, the e⁄ect of higher proportional trade costs is very similar to tougher
competition: the higher delivered cost for some ￿rms makes competition tougher for them at any
given cuto⁄ level ch
D ￿and they respond by adjusting their markups downward on all exported
goods. A higher customization cost increment 1=￿lh also generates a similar e⁄ect, inducing lower
markups across exported products. However, this cost disproportionately hits products further
away from the core, driving up their delivered costs relative to varieties closer to the core. This
directly translates into higher relative export sales for the varieties closer to the core.
We note that our theoretical model does not restrict the pattern of correlation between trade
and customization costs. If they were positively correlated, then higher trade costs would a⁄ect
17In equilibrium, a lower c
h
D in a country is associated with a downward shift in the distribution of markups across
all products sold in that market (which we characterize as tougher competition). In the appendix, we show that this
key prediction for the e⁄ects of tougher competition holds for a wide set of demand parametrizations.
20disproportionately more varieties further away from the core due to the extra kick coming from
customization costs. Higher trade costs would then lead to higher relative export sales for the
varieties closer to the core. If trade and customization costs were instead negatively correlated,
then higher trade costs would a⁄ect varieties further away from the core proportionately less due
to the countervailing impact of customization costs. In this case, a higher trade cost for the core
variety could even lead to lower relative export sales for the varieties closer to the core. In the
end, which case is the most relevant one remains an empirical question that we will address in our
empirical analysis.
In summary, we can test for di⁄erences in competition across export markets by examining the
response of the skewness of exported sales for a given ￿rm ￿after controlling for the bilateral trade
costs. If a bilateral trade barrier exhibits either proportional trade costs (across the product line)
or increasing trade costs, then higher levels of that trade barrier will induce higher relative export
sales for varieties closer to the core ￿after controlling for the e⁄ects of market competition in that
destination (common for exporters from any source country). On the other hand, if a bilateral
trade barrier exhibits trade costs that increase less than proportionally along the product ladder,
then it is possible for the trade barrier to induce lower relative export sales for varieties closer to the
core. Crucially, our multi-country model tells us that cross-country di⁄erences in the ￿ toughness￿
of competition are determined by cross-country di⁄erences in own country size and geographical
remoteness (see (24)). Since central countries with large local markets exhibit tougher competition
than peripheral countries with small local markets, for each ￿rm relative export sales should be
higher for the varieties closer to the core in the former than in the latter.
4 Empirical analysis
4.1 Trade data and dependent variables
We test these predictions using comprehensive ￿rm-level data on annual shipments by all French
exporters to all countries in the world for a set of more than 10,000 goods. Firm-level exports
are collected by French customs and include export sales for each 8-digit (combined nomenclature)
product by destination country.18 A ￿rm located in the French metropolitan territory must report
this detailed export information so long as the following criteria are met: For within EU exports, the
18We thank the French customs administration for making this data available to researchers at the CEPII.
21￿rm￿ s annual trade value exceeds 250,000 Euros;19 and for exports outside the EU, the exported
value to a destination exceeds 1,000 Euros or a weight of a ton. Despite these limitations, the
database is nearly comprehensive. In a given year (on average), 102,300 ￿rms report exports across
225 destination countries (or territories) for 11,578 products. This represents data on over 2 million
shipments per year. We restrict our analysis to export data for 2003, and to manufacturing, mostly
eliminating ￿rms in the service and wholesale/distribution sector to ensure that ￿rms take part in
the production of the goods they export.20 This leaves us with data on over a million shipments
by ￿rms in the whole range of manufacturing sectors. We also drop observations for ￿rms that the
French national statistical institute reports as having an a¢ liate abroad. This is intended to avoid
the issue that multinational ￿rms may ￿nd it optimal to locate the production of some of their
best product in their local production facility for certain destination countries, following the lines
of Helpman et al. (2004). We therefore concentrate on the ones that do not have this possibility,
in order to reduce noise in the rankings.
We use three main measures to capture the skewness of a ￿rm￿ s export sales (within destina-
tions). The ￿rst measure is closest to the modeling assumptions and assumes a product ladder that
does not vary across destinations (for a given ￿rm). We thus rank all the products exported by a
￿rm according to the value of exports to the world21, and use this ranking as an indicator for the
product rank mi . As we brie￿ y mentioned in the introduction, this ranking is highly correlated
with a similar ranking of products across destinations based on export sales to that destination.
The Spearman rank correlation between these measures is .68.22 Naturally, this correlation might
be partly driven by ￿rms that export only one product to one market, for which the global rank has
to be the local rank. In table 1, we therefore investigate the robustness of this ￿gure by gradually
restricting the sample to ￿rms that export many products to any markets. The bottom line is that
this correlation remains quite stable: for ￿rms exporting at least 50 products and to at least 50
countries, the ￿gure is still .58. Another possibility is that this correlation is di⁄erent across income
levels of importing countries. Restricting the sample to the top 50 or 20% richest importers as we
do in the regressions later, the correlation hardly changes at all (.69 and .71 respectively).
19If that threshold is not met, ￿rms can choose to report under a simpli￿ed scheme without supplying export des-
tinations. However, in practice, many ￿rms under that threshold report the detailed export destination information.
20Some large distributors such as Carrefour account for a disproportionate number of annual shipments.
21We experimented using the number of countries served for the global ranking of products inside ￿rms, with very
little di⁄erence in results.
22Arkolakis and Muendler (2008, page 27) report a correlation coe¢ cient between global and local ranks of .577
(.596) for Brazil (Chile). Eckel et al. (2009) report a rank correlation of .76 between home and export sales of
Mexican ￿rms.
22Table 1: Spearman Correlations Between Global and Local Rankings
Firms exporting at least: # products
to # countries 1 2 5 10 50
1 67.93% 67.78% 67.27% 66.26% 59.39%
2 67.82% 67.74% 67.28% 66.28% 59.39%
5 67.55% 67.51% 67.2% 66.3% 59.43%
10 67.02% 67% 66.82% 66.12% 59.46%
50 61.66% 61.66% 61.64% 61.53% 58.05%
Although high, this correlation still highlights substantial departures from a steady global prod-
uct ladder. A natural alternative is therefore to use the country speci￿c rank as an indicator for the
product rank mi . In this interpretation, the identity of the core (or other rank number) product
can change across destinations. Our assumptions on the delivered costs across the product ladder
then hold for a speci￿c rank in the product ladder, and not for a particular product. We can thus





X(m0;c)) for m < m0. Since many ￿rms export few products to many des-
tinations, increasing the higher product rank m0 disproportionately reduces the number of available
￿rm/destination observations. For most of our analysis, we pick m = 0 (core product) and m0 = 1,
but also report results for m0 = 2.23 Thus, we construct the ratio of a ￿rm￿ s export sales to every
destination for its best performing product (either globally, or in each destination) relative to its
next best performing product (again, either globally, or in each destination). The local ratios can
be computed so long as a ￿rm exports at least two products to a destination (or three when m0 = 2).
The global ratios can be computed so long as a ￿rm exports its top (in terms of world exports) two
products to a destination. We thus obtain these measures that are ￿rm-destination speci￿c, so long
as those criteria are met. We use those ratios in logs, so that they represent percentage di⁄erences
in export sales. We refer to the ratios as either local or global, based on the ranking method used
to compute them. Last we also constrain the sample so that the two products considered belong
to the same 2-digit product category (there are 97 of those). This setting seems slightly less noisy
and we retain it for the rest of our regressions.24
Our third measure seeks to capture changes in skewness over the entire range of exported
products (instead of being con￿ned to the top two or three products). We use several di⁄erent
skewness statistics for the distribution of ￿rm export sales to a destination: the standard deviation
23We also obtain very similar results for m = 1 and m
0 = 2.
24Results available upon request show that this restriction makes very little di⁄erence to the estimates.
23of logged sales, a Her￿ndhal index, and a Theil index (a measure of entropy). Since these statistics
are independent of the identity of the products exported to a destination, they are ￿local￿ by
nature, and do not have any global ranking counterpart. These statistics can be computed for
every ￿rm-destination combination where the ￿rm exports two or more products. The Theil and
standard deviation statistics have the attractive property that they are invariant to truncation
from below, when the underlying distribution is Pareto; this distribution provides a very good ￿t
for the within-￿rm distribution of export sales to a destination. A graphical way to summarize how
those product level sales are distributed close to Pareto is to compute the average share of the ￿rst,
second... product in the total sales of ￿rms, and graph this average share against rank. Bernard,
Redding and Schott (2006) do this for ￿rms producing exactly 4, 6, 8 and 10 products. Figure 2
does a similar exercice looking at shares of the top 50 products in total exports of ￿rms that export
between 50 and 100 products.25 Although there are clearly departures from Pareto at both ends
of the distribution, the tightness of the relationship is quite striking. In ￿gure 3, we describe this
distribution inside the ￿rm, and report results from within ￿rm-destination regressions of log rank
on log size (for the 7570 French ￿rms exporting more than 10 products and less than 50 in our
sample). The median ￿t is .906, and the median coe¢ cient is -.352.
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Figure 2: Average share of product sales depending on the rank of the product.
25In order to avoid the mechanical e⁄ect that ￿rms exporting one product have a 100% share on top product (at
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Figure 3: Coe¢ cients and ￿t of ￿rm-level log rank-size regressions.
4.2 Independent variables
Our theoretical model predicts that the toughness of competition in a destination is determined
by that destination￿ s size, and by its geography (proximity to other big countries). We control
for country size using GDP expressed in a common currency at market exchange rates. We now
seek a control for the geography of a destination that does not rely on country-level data for that
destination. We use the supply potential concept introduced by Redding and Venables (2004) as
such a control. Intuitively, the supply potential is the aggregate predicted exports to a destination
based on a bilateral trade gravity equation (in logs) with both exporter and importer ￿xed e⁄ects
and the standard bi-lateral measures of trade barriers/enhancers. We then construct the predicted
aggregate exports to each destination without using the importer ￿xed e⁄ects (and thus uncorrelated
with the importer ￿xed e⁄ect by construction). We call this measure a destination￿ s foreign supply
potential. Its construction is closely related to that of a country￿ s market potential (which seeks to
capture a measure of predicted import demand for a country).26 The construction of the supply
potential measures is discussed in greater detail in Redding and Venables (2004); we use the foreign
supply measure for the year 2003 from Mayer (2008) who extends the analysis to many more
countries and more years of data.27 We also use a set of controls for bilateral trade barriers (￿
in the model) between France and the destination country: distance, contiguity, colonial links,
common-language, and dummies for membership of Regional Trading Agreements, GATT/WTO,
26Redding and Venables (2004) show that this construction for supply potential (and the similar one for market
potential) is also consistent with its theoretical counterpart in a Dixit-Stiglitz-Krugman model. They construct those
measures for a cross-section of 100 countries in 1994. Mayer (2008) uses the same methodology to cover more countries
and a longer time period.
27As is the case with market potential, a country￿ s supplier potential is strongly correlated with that country￿ s
GDP: big trading economies tend to be located near one-another. The supply potential data is available online at
http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/marketpotentials.htm
25and a common currency area (the eurozone in this case).28
4.3 Results
Before reporting the regression results of the skewness measures on the destination country mea-
sures, we ￿rst show some scatter plots for the global ratio against both destination country GDP
and our measure of foreign supply potential. These are displayed in ￿gures 4 and 5. For each
destination, we use the mean global ratio across exporting ￿rms. Since the ￿rm-level measure is
very noisy, the precision of the mean increases with the number of available ￿rm data points (for
each destination). We ￿rst show the scatter plots using all available destinations, with symbol
weights proportional to the number of available ￿rm observations, and then again dropping any
destination with fewer than 250 exporting ￿rms.29 Those scatter plots show a very strong positive
correlation between the export share ratios and the measures of toughness of competition in the
destination. Absent any variation in the toughness of competition across destinations ￿such as in a
world with monopolistic competition and C.E.S. preferences where markups are exogenously ￿xed
￿the variation in the relative export shares should be white noise. The data show that variations in
competition (at least as proxied by country size and supplier potential) is strong enough to induce
large variations in the ￿rms￿relative export sales across destinations. Scatter plots for the local
ratio and Theil index look surprisingly similar.
We now turn to our regression analysis using the three skewness measures. Each observation
summarizes the skewness of export sales for a given ￿rm to a given destination. Since we seek to
uncover variation in that skewness for a given ￿rm, we include ￿rm ￿xed e⁄ects throughout. We
use destination speci￿c controls for both competition (GDP and supplier potential, both in logs)
and for the bilateral trade and customization costs when exporting from France (we discuss how
we specify those in the paragraph below). There are undoubtedly other unobserved characteristics
of countries that a⁄ect competition in that destination and would be captured in the error term
(as well as other country characteristics that could a⁄ect the skewness of export sales via a channel
other than competition). Such unobserved country characteristics are common to ￿rms exporting
to that destination and hence generate a correlated error-term structure, potentially biasing the
standard error of our variables of interest downwards. The standard clustering procedure does not
apply very well here for two reasons: i) the level of clustering is not nested within the level of ￿xed
28All those variables are available at http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm
29Increasing that cuto⁄ level for the number of exporters slightly increases the ￿t and slope of the regression line
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Figure 5: Mean Global Ratio and Destination Supply Potential in 2003
27e⁄ects, ii) the number of clusters is quite small with respect to the size of each cluster. Harrigan
and Deng (2008) experience a similar problem and use the solution proposed by Wooldridge (2006),
which recommends to run country-speci￿c random e⁄ects on ￿rm-demeaned data, with a robust
covariance matrix estimation. This procedure allows to account for ￿rm ￿xed e⁄ects, as well as
country-level correlation patterns in the error term. We follow this estimation strategy here.30
Our ￿rst set of results investigate the question of the trade and customization costs speci￿cation.
The gravity literature has identi￿ed a very large set of covariates that are likely to in￿ uence both
trade and customization costs, which we use here. We investigate the sensitivity of our estimates
to the trade and customization costs speci￿cation in Table 2. The ￿rst three columns take global
sales￿ratios as a dependent variable. The last three consider local ratios. Columns (1) and (4)
omit all trade costs, columns (2) and (5) include all classical gravity covariates, while columns (3)
and (6) include a global freeness of trade index between France and the destination country under
consideration. This index attributes weights to all trade costs components of the preceding column,
those weights being drawn from the same bilateral trade equation used to derive the foreign supply
potential variable. It is immediately clear that while market size in￿ uence￿ s on sales￿ratios is very
stable and of the expected positive sign, the foreign supply potential coe¢ cient is sensitive to the
trade costs speci￿cation. While comparable to the GDP coe¢ cient in columns (1) and (4), the
estimate of supply potential falls drastically, and most of the time to insigni￿cance, when trade
costs are taken into account. When looking at correlations between those variables, it is easy
to understand why. France is a very centrally located country in terms of worldwide economic
geography.31 Therefore, for a given destination country, ease of access from France and supply
potential (which captures how centrally located the destination country is) are very strongly, and
positively, correlated. For instance, log supply potential and log freeness of trade have a correlation
coe¢ cient of almost 78%. Note also that log freeness of trade and log distance have a pairwise
correlation of 94%. Therefore distance from France and trade costs in general are so correlated
for supply potential of the destination country that estimating those together yields very imprecise
estimates. Note that those correlations would be much lower for an exporting country such as the
United States or China, and it would be very interesting to see if supply potential resists better in
30Results available upon request are qualitatively similar using a set of di⁄erent estimation procedures for our
benchmark regression: ￿rm-level ￿xed e⁄ects with/without country clustering, demeaned data run with simple OLS
or with country random e⁄ects as in the benchmark. Results point to the fact that not taking into account country-
level correlation when calculating standard errors yields a large underestimate of standard errors for both GDP and
foreign supply potential, but only challenges signi￿cance for the latter variable.
31Using our measure of foreign supply potential, France is at rank eight out of 196 countries for which the variable
is available in 2003.
28such a sample. In the following tables we stick with freeness of trade as our measure of trade costs,
which combines the advantages of compactness and consistency with the way supply potential is
calculated, that is from a bilateral trade equation.
We now report our main results using the global sales ratio in Table 3, the local ratio in Table 4,
and the overall skewness measures in Table 5. The ￿rst column uses ￿rst to second product ratio.
The second column uses the ratio of the best to third best product. The next two columns return
to the initial ratio (best to second best), and progressively select country destinations with income
levels above a threshold. Column 3 excludes all countries below the median income level, while
column 4 only selects destinations in the top 20% of the cross-country income distribution.32 The
results using the skewness statistics (standard deviation of log sales, Her￿ndahl, Theil) are reported
in Table 5, with columns 4-5 representing the same selection by destination country income as in
the previous two tables (reported for the Theil only). Since the measures of skewness in this table
can be mechanically a⁄ected by the number of observations used to compute it (especially when
this number of products exported by a ￿rm to a destination is very small), we also control directly
for that number in the regressions using an unreported cubic polynomial.
All three tables strongly con￿rm the important and signi￿cant impact of destination country
size on the within-￿rm measure of export skewness: a French ￿rm sells relatively more of its best
performing products to bigger country destinations. This e⁄ect is also economically signi￿cant.
Using the ￿rst column￿ s estimate of Table 3, a doubling of GDP raises the sales￿ratio by (2(0:093)￿
1) ￿ 100 = 6:63%. The e⁄ect is roughly the same using the alternative (local) de￿nition of the
ratio. If the Czech Republic￿ s GDP were equal to German GDP (an increase from the 79th to 99th
percentile in the world￿ s GDP distribution in 2003), then French ￿rms would respond by increasing
the relative shipment of their best global product (relative to their second best global product) by
36% (from an observed mean ratio of 20 in 2003 to 25.6).
The e⁄ect of geography, via supply potential, is overall not very signi￿cant in explaining rela-
tive exports sales based on their destination-speci￿c ranking. This variable has an expected and
signi￿cant e⁄ect in columns 1-2 in Table 4 for the local ratio. The e⁄ect on the skewness measures
are also signi￿cant in similar speci￿cations (columns 2-4). Lastly, the e⁄ect of supply potential
does not have a signi￿cant impact on the global ranking. This may be due in part to higher level
of noise in this measure. However, as shown in Table 2, the main issue with this variable is the
32Since French ￿rms ship disproportionately more goods to countries with higher incomes, the number of observa-
tions drops very slowly with the number of excluded country destinations.
29Table 2: Global ratio of core product (m = 0) to m0 product sales￿regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. Var. Ratio of core to second product sales￿regressions
Global ratio Local ratio
ln GDP 0.092￿￿￿ 0.083￿￿￿ 0.093￿￿￿ 0.073￿￿￿ 0.057￿￿￿ 0.078￿￿￿
(0.013) (0.012) (0.011) (0.008) (0.005) (0.008)
ln supply potential 0.067￿￿￿ -0.017 -0.000 0.080￿￿￿ 0.018 0.044￿￿￿
(0.016) (0.024) (0.019) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015)




colonial link -0.060 -0.041
(0.051) (0.043)




common currency 0.182￿￿￿ 0.336￿￿￿
(0.047) (0.037)
both in GATT 0.006 -0.033
(0.046) (0.026)
ln freeness of trade 0.059￿￿￿ 0.026￿￿￿
(0.014) (0.010)
Observations 56096 56096 56096 96892 96892 96892
Within R2 0.004 0.006 0.005 0.007 0.011 0.007
Note: All columns use Wooldridge (2006) procedure: country-speci￿c random
e⁄ects on ￿rm-demeaned data, with a robust covariance matrix estima-
tion. Standard errors in parentheses. Signi￿cance levels:
￿ p < 0:1,
￿￿
p < 0:05,
￿￿￿ p < 0:01
30Table 3: Global ratio of core product (m = 0) to m0 product sales￿regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ln GDP 0.093￿￿￿ 0.158￿￿￿ 0.087￿￿￿ 0.061￿￿￿ 0.079￿￿￿
(0.011) (0.029) (0.012) (0.015) (0.012)
ln supply potential -0.000 0.044 -0.013 -0.031￿ -0.020
(0.019) (0.049) (0.019) (0.018) (0.021)
ln freeness of trade 0.059￿￿￿ 0.066￿ 0.065￿￿￿ 0.068￿￿￿ 0.062￿￿￿
(0.014) (0.035) (0.015) (0.018) (0.013)
ln GDP per cap 0.044￿￿
(0.019)
m0 = 1 2 1 1 1
Destination GDP/cap all all top 50% top 20% all
Observations 56096 5689 50626 40967 56096
Within R2 0.005 0.019 0.004 0.002 0.005
Note: All columns use Wooldridge (2006) procedure: country-speci￿c random e⁄ects
on ￿rm-demeaned data, with a robust covariance matrix estimation. Standard
errors in parentheses. Signi￿cance levels:
￿ p < 0:1,
￿￿ p < 0:05,
￿￿￿ p < 0:01
Table 4: Local ratio of core product (m = 0) to m0 product sales￿regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ln GDP 0.078￿￿￿ 0.099￿￿￿ 0.073￿￿￿ 0.041￿￿ 0.065￿￿￿
(0.008) (0.013) (0.012) (0.020) (0.011)
ln supply potential 0.044￿￿￿ 0.052￿ 0.027 -0.004 0.024
(0.015) (0.029) (0.020) (0.018) (0.016)
ln freeness of trade 0.026￿￿￿ 0.012 0.032￿￿ 0.044￿￿￿ 0.029￿￿￿
(0.010) (0.020) (0.016) (0.015) (0.010)
ln GDP per cap 0.034￿￿
(0.014)
m0 = 1 2 1 1 1
Destination GDP/cap all all top 50% top 20% all
Observations 96891 49557 84721 64666 96891
Within R2 0.007 0.009 0.005 0.002 0.007
Note: All columns use Wooldridge (2006) procedure: country-speci￿c random e⁄ects
on ￿rm-demeaned data, with a robust covariance matrix estimation. Standard
errors in parentheses. Signi￿cance levels:
￿ p < 0:1,
￿￿ p < 0:05,
￿￿￿ p < 0:01
31Table 5: Theil index regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln GDP 0.140￿￿￿ 0.019￿￿￿ 0.046￿￿￿ 0.047￿￿￿ 0.035￿￿￿ 0.039￿￿￿
(0.011) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003)
ln supply potential 0.031 0.008￿￿￿ 0.014￿￿￿ 0.009￿ 0.003 0.004
(0.024) (0.002) (0.004) (0.005) (0.008) (0.004)
ln freeness of trade 0.092￿￿￿ 0.008￿￿￿ 0.022￿￿￿ 0.024￿￿￿ 0.022￿￿ 0.023￿￿￿
(0.019) (0.002) (0.004) (0.006) (0.009) (0.005)
ln GDP per cap 0.017￿￿￿
(0.006)
Dep. Var. s.d. ln x herf theil theil theil theil
Destination GDP/cap all all all top 50% top 20% all
Observations 82096 82096 82096 73035 57082 82096
Within R2 0.110 0.164 0.359 0.357 0.342 0.360
Note: Firm-level ￿xed e⁄ects for all columns. Standard errors in parentheses. Signi￿cance levels:
￿
p < 0:1,
￿￿ p < 0:05,
￿￿￿ p < 0:01. All columns include a cubic polynomial of the number of
products exported by the ￿rm to the country
very high correlation with standard measures of trade costs for the particular case of our exporting
country where distance from France and supply potential (related to economic centrality) happen
to be very strongly negatively correlated.33
The last column in all three regression tables adds GDP per capita as an additional regressor.
We do this to control for di⁄erences in preferences across countries (outside the scope of our
theoretical model) tied to product quality and consumer income. In particular, we want to allow
consumer income to bias consumption towards higher quality varieties. If within-￿rm product
quality is negatively related to its distance from the core product, then this would induce a positive
correlation between consumer income and the within-￿rm skewness of expenditure shares. Our
empirical results strongly support this hypothesis.34 Nevertheless, we still ￿nd a very strong e⁄ect
of competition, now captured by the independent contribution of country population (the coe¢ cient
for log GDP, when controlling for log GDP per capita), on the skewness of within-￿rm export sales.
Measuring the independent contribution of geography now becomes even more problematic as the
same forces that generate a link between geography and increased competition are also most likely
33When running all regressions of Tables 3, 4, and 5 without trade freeness, supply potential is systematically
positive and signi￿cant at the one percent level.
34Consumer income could also have an independent e⁄ect on competition, with ambiguous consequences on that
skewness measure.
32the same ones that are also re￿ ected in higher GDP per capita.35
We now turn to the e⁄ects of bilateral trade and customization costs. All three tables show
that our trade freeness measure has a strong signi￿cant and positive impact on the skewness of
the ￿rms￿export sales. Interestingly, this can arise in our model through the relative force of two
e⁄ects that go in opposite direction: an decrease in trade costs (￿) should decrease skewness, while
an decrease in customization costs (￿) should increase it. The positive coe¢ cient on our measure
of trade freeness suggests that the second e⁄ect dominates the ￿rst.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have developed a model of multi-product ￿rms that highlights how di⁄erences in
market size and geography a⁄ect the within-￿rm distribution of export sales across destinations.
This e⁄ect on the ￿rms￿product mix choice is driven by variations in the toughness of competition
across markets captured by downward shifts in the distribution of markups across products. We
test these predictions for a comprehensive set of French exporters, and ￿nd that market size and
geography indeed have a very strong impact on their product mix choice across world destinations.
In particular, French ￿rms skew their export sales towards better performing products in big des-
tination markets, and markets where many exporters from around the world compete (high foreign
supply potential markets). We take this as a strong indication that di⁄erences in the toughness of
competition across export markets generate substantial responses in ￿rm-level markups indirectly
revealed by pronounced changes in the skewness of export sales. Trade models based on exogenous
markups cannot explain this strong signi￿cant link between those destination market characteristics
and the within-￿rm skewness of export sales (after controlling for bilateral trade costs). Theoret-
ically, this within ￿rm change in product mix driven by the trading environment has important
repercussions on ￿rm productivity ￿and can explain the observed link between trade liberalization
and productivity improvement within ￿rms.
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347 Appendix A: Tougher Competition and Firm Productivity
7.1 Closed Economy
Consider a closed economy and a ￿rm with cost c 2 [cD!M;cD!M￿1] selling M products. Output


























(1 + !M)(1 ￿ !)
which is always the case for M > 1 as the LHS and the RHS are identical at M = 0 and M = 1,
and the RHS is increasing and concave in M. This proves that, holding M > 1 constant, ￿rm
output per worker is larger in a market where competition is tougher.
As to the case of endogenous changes in M, the negative impact of cD on output per worker is
guaranteed by the continuity of Q(c)=C(c) with respect to cD (both Q(c) and C(c) are continuous
in cD since the ￿rm produces zero units of a variety right before it is dropped when competition
gets tougher). To see this, consider large downward changes in the cuto⁄ cD. The result for given
M tells us that productivity for a ￿rm with given c increases on all ranges of cD where the number
of varieties produced does not change. This just leaves a discrete number of cD￿ s where the ￿rm
changes the number of products produced. Since the productivity measure is continuous at those
cD￿ s, and increasing everywhere else, it must be increasing everywhere.
The unavailaility of data on physical output often leads to the estimation of ￿ measured￿rather
than physical productivity. For a ￿rm with cost c 2 [cD!M;cD!M￿1] selling M products, measured
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35where the negative sign is granted by the fact that c 2 [cD!M;cD!M￿1] implies M!2M ￿
1 ￿ !2￿￿
c=!M￿2￿




> 0. This proves that, holding M > 1 constant, also measured
productivity is larger in a market where competition is tougher. The same applies in the case of




=C(c) is continuous in cD.















Hence, whereas tougher competition (lower cD) has no impact on the physical productivity of a
single-product ￿rm, it raises instead its measured productivity. This is due to the fact that measured
productivity is also a⁄ected by markup changes when the competitive environment changes.
7.2 Open economy
Consider an open economy and a ￿rm with cost c selling M varieties from country l to country h.
Output per worker is given by (27). Inspecting (27) reveals that the sign of the impact of cD on
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for M > 1. Our de￿nition of output per worker excludes output wasted in transit due iceberg fric-
tions in the numerator but not the corresponding employment in the denominator. Note, however,
that the impact of cD on output per worker would be negative even if we excluded also employment
wasted in transit at the denominar or included output wasted in transit also at the numerator.
As in the closed economy, the fact that ouput per worker is continuous at a discrete number of
cl
D￿ s, and decreasing in cl
D everywhere else, it must be increasing in cl
D everywhere.
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